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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

• "Tf

OF UTAH,
Pl aintiff-Peti ti oner,

JAMES D. CHAMBERS, STANLEY NED
JACOBSEN, and J.D. (last name
unknown),

Case No. 19151
Case No. 19152

Defendants-Respondents.:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN PETITION FOR REHEARING
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing

is whether the Court incorrectly concluded that "the statutory
language [of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402 (1)

(1978) J should not be

used in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases."

~

v. Chambers, Utah, __ P.2d __ , Nos. 19151 and 19152, slip op. at
9 (filed October 21, 1985)

(emphasis added)

(a copy of the entire

opinion is contained in the Addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants, James D. Chambers and Stanley Ned Jacobsen,
were charged with burglary, a second degree felony,

under UTAH

CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1978), and theft, a second degree felony,
under UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-6-404 (1978).

defendants were found guilty as charged.
the Utah State Prison for
1,,

After a jury trial, both
Each was sentenced to

a term of one to fifteen years for

lylary and for a tern of one to fifteen years for theft, the
rii_r_r1'-·1--::...i

tn

run consecutively.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The State agrees with the fact statement set forth

the Court's opinion

in~~~

in

Chambers, slip op. at 1-2.

SUMMARY fil ARGUMENT
In stating that the language of§ 76-6-402(1) should
not be used "in any form" in instructing juries, the Court
appears to have concluded that a permissive inference
instruction, which is not merely a verbatim recitation of the
statutory language but which uses a "form" of that language, is
improper.

Such a conclusion is contrary to established law.
If the State is misinterpreting the Court's statement,

and the Court did not intend to prohibit a permissive inference
instruction regarding unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained
possession of recently stolen property, perhaps the Court's
opinion could be modified so as to clarify this point.
INTRODUCTION
In Brown y. Pickard,

den~ing

reh'g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P.

512 (1886), this Court set forth the standard for determining
whether a petition for rehearing should be granted:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 <citation omitted).

In Cummings y.

Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
-2-

all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result
. • • • If there are some reasons, however,
such as we have indicated above, or other
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624.

The argument portion of this

brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and
should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT "THE STATUTORY
LANGUAGE [OF § 76-6-402(1)) SHOULD NOT BE
USED IN ANY FORM IN INSTRUCTING JURIES IN
CRIMINAL CASES" APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED LAW.
After fully analyzing the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Francis v. Franklin,

~-

U.S.

~-'

105

s. Ct.

1965 (1985), the Court in Chambers reached the inescapable
conclusion that certain jury instructions that were given were
unconstitutional because they either created a mandatory
rebuttable presumption in violation of Franklin or could
ieasonably have been understood to relieve the State of its
•Jpn of proof in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S .
• r:

11979).

Chambers, slip op. at 4-7.

However, the Court

further concluded that "the statutory language [of UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-6-402(1)

(1978)] should not be used in any form in

instructing juries in criminal cases."
added).

.l.d. at 9 (emphasis

This conclusion appears to be contrary to established

law.
By stating that the language of§ 76-6-402(1)1 should
not be used "in any form" in jury instructions, the Court appears
to have decided that the following instruction,
though embodying a permissive inference,

for example, even

rather than a mandatory

or mandatory rebuttable presumption, would be unconstitutional:
You are further instructed that one who
is found to be in possession of property
recently stolen, may be found to be the
guilty person unless he gives a satisfactory
explanation of his possession thereof.2
That this is what the Court actually concluded is further
supported by its application of Chambers in a companion case,
State y. Pacheco, Utah, __ P.2d __ ,No. 20047

(filed October

21, 1985) ,3 where the Court makes quite clear that the "inference
set out in section 76-6-402(1)" is not one for jury
consideration, but is only applicable to the court's
determination of whether a "prima facie" case has been

1 Section 76-6-402(1), which is simply a codification of a
"traditional corrunon-law inference deeply rooted in our law,"
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973), reads:
Possession of property recently stolen, when
no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
2 This particular instruction was upheld in State v. Asay, 631
P.2d 861 (Utah 1981).
3 The State is also petitioning for rehearing in Pacheco.
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established.

Pacheco, slip op. at 3-4.

The Court apparently

believed that Franklin and Sandstrom dictated such a conclusion.
nowever, this is not consistent with Franklin, Sandstrom, or
1
1'.

iled Supreme Court decisions.
q_

11.s.

~Sandstrom,

442 U.S. at 519

Nor is it consistent with Barnes y. United States, 412
837

(1973), which expressly held that a jury instruction

permitting the inference of guilty knowledge from unexplained
possession of recently stolen property, whether given pursuant to
a statute or based upon the common-law inference, satisfies the
requirements of due process and does not violate a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination.

412 U.S. at 846-47 •

.c.t.

State y. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44, 45-6 (Utah 1978); State y.
Kirkham, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638 ( 1967)

(cases implicitly

recognizing the validity of this common-law inference in the
context of approving its use in burglary cases).

The inference

regarding possession of recently stolen property, which is often
critical to the government's case, is widely accepted in both
federal and state courts.
1178 (1978 and Supp. 1985).

See generally, Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d
Thus, it appears the Court either

overlooked or misapprehended significant case law in determining
that the statutory language of

§

76-6-40 2 (1) should not be used

in "any form" in jury instructions.4
4 It is somewhat confusing that the Court in Chambers seemingly
did not disapprove of the jury instruction upheld in State y.
~(quoted above).
Chambers, slip op. at 7. Despite the
Court's observation to the contrary, the~ instruction clearly
fll',!Jloyed the language of § 76-6-402 (1) . .s.e& AsiJ.:;t, 631 P.2d at
Hf'J
Although the words "shall be deemed prima facie evidence"
''"' e not used, a "form" of the language contained in § 76-6411111) obviously was used in the instruction.

-5-

If the State is misinterpreting the Court's statement
that "the statutory language should not be used in any form,"
perhaps the Chambers opinion could be clarified.

It may be that

the Court did not intend for that language to be read so as to
preclude the giving of an instruction similar to that given in
~--i.e.,

an instruction that is not merely a verbatim

recitation of

§

76-6-402(1), but one that avoids the use of the

term "prima facie" (or defines that term appropriately) and sets
out an inference that

~

be drawn by the jury from the

unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently
stolen property.

If this is so, the current language probably

should be modified in order to make that point clear.

Such a

clarification would, of course, cure the apparent inconsistency
of the Court's statement with United States Supreme Court case
law holding that this inference regarding possession of recently
stolen property is constitutionally valid.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, i t appears that
the Court in State y. Chambers either overlooked or
misapprehended significant case law in concluding that the
language of

§

76-6-402(1) should not be used "in any form" in

instructing juries in criminal cases.

Therefore, the State's

petition for rehearing should be granted and the case should be
restored to the calendar for reargument or resubmission.
Utah R. App. P. 35(c)

~

(1985).

Alternatively, if the State is misinterpreting the
Court's opinion in this regard, perhaps the opinion can be

-6-

n1odif ied so as to make clear that a permissive inference

instruction like that upheld in

~

is still viable under

The State certifies that this petition is presented in
faith and not for purposes of delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

~f

November, 1985.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

cffi~J]~

~

DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed to the following
counsel for defendants this

~-of

Kenneth R. Brown
10 West 300 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
J. Bruce Savage, Jr.
P.O. Box 2520
Park City, Utah 84060
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November, 1985:

ADDENDUM

a
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-----00000----state of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No. 19151

v.
James D. Chambers, Stanley Ned
Jacobsen, and J.D. (last name
unknown),
Defendants and Appellant.
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
James D. Chambers, Stanley Ned
Jacobsen, and J. D. (last name
unknown),
Defendants and Appellant.

No. 19152

F I L E D

October 21, 1985

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

DURHAM, Justice:
Defendants James Chambers and Stanley Jacobsen appeal
from a conviction of burglary, a second degree "felony under
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-202, and theft, a second degree felony
under U.C.A., 1953, ~ 76-6-404. We reverse the convictions and
remand for a new trial.
On January 6, 1983, an informant contacted officers of
the Park City Police Department and told them that a burglary
had taken place in the vicinity of Park City. The informant
stated that he knew who had committed the crime.
Police
officers met with the informant, who offered to take the
officers to the residence where the stolen items were being
held.
At that meeting, the informant said that some of the
items involved in the burglary were stereos with speakers,
video cassettes, televisions, and clothing. The informant then
took the officers to the residence of James Chambers. The
informant also arranged a meeting between defendants and a Park
City Police officer operating under cover; the purpose of the
meeting was to have the undercover officer make a "buy" of some
of the stolen property from defendants.
On January 7, the
officer, the informant, and defendants met at the informant's
apartment.
After some conversation in which defendants
e•pressed concern about the possible presence of police in the
are~, defendants took the officer outside to a car and showed
l1m a video cassette recorder which the officer bought for $200.

Also on January 7, a burglary was reported by a Summit
Park resident, Richard Thompson. Mr. Thompson had returned hone
that day after a business trip and discovered that his home had
been burglarized. He reported missing a Sony video cassette
recorder, a cassette deck, stereo equipment, a pistol, a leather
coat, and a pair of Tony Lama cowboy boots. Mr. Thompson later
identified the video cassette recorder purchased from defendants
as the one missing from his home.
On January 10, 1983, an officer of the Park City Pol1r·,_
Department obtained a search warrant for defendant Chambers'
residence.
Defendant Jacobsen was also living in the residencE
at the time.
Pursuant to the warrant, officers searched the
home and seized one pair of Tony Lama boots and a .22 caliber
pistol. At trial, Mr. Thompson identified the pistol and the
boots as those stolen from his home.
Prior to trial, defendants filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. They also
filed a motion to require the State to disclose the identity of
the confidential informant.
Both motions were argued before the
trial court and were subsequently denied.
At trial, defendants presented testimony which sought
to establish their whereabouts at the time of the crime.
Defendants also presented evidence in explanation of their possession
of the video cassette recorder, the pistol, and the cowboy boots.
On appeal defendants raise five issues:
invalidity of
the search warrant, denial of due process by the court's failure
to require the State to disclose the identity of the confidential
informant, two constitutional errors in connection with jury
instructions, and insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants' first argument is that the trial court
erred by not suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the
search warrant; defendants claim that the underlying affidavit
was not sufficient based on the two-pronged test established in
Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and followed in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Defendants
concede that under the "totality of the circumstances" test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the affidavit would have been
sufficient. However, defendants contend that the Gates test is
not the appropriate test to be applied in this case, because the
Gates test was prospective only.
In particular, defendants rely
on the following language:
For all of these reasons, we conclude
that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged
test" established by our decisions in Aguilar
and Spinelli. In its place, we reaffirm the
totality of the circumstances analysis that
traditionally has formed probable cause
determinations.

Nos. 19151 and 19152
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462 U.S. at 238 (footnote and citations omitted).
It is this
very language, however, that indicates that the totality of the
circumstances test is the traditional analysis and that the twopronged test was a supplementary standard which was superimposed
on the traditional test.
By •reaffirming• the traditional
analysis, in effect, Gates stripped away certain refinements
and retained the simpler totality of the circumstances test,
thereby returning probable cause analysis to its traditional
basis.
Further, in Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. ct. 2085
11984), the Supreme Court retroactively applied the Gates test
to determine the validity of a search warrant issued~
September 1980, almost three years prior to the announcement of
the Gates decision. We find, therefore, that the application
of the totality of the circumstances test was proper here.
Defendants next contend that they were denied due
process of law because the trial court failed to require the
state to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which was applicable at
the time of trial, provides:
A witness has a privilege to refuse to
disclose the identity of a person who has
furnished information purporting to disclose
a violation of a provision of the laws of
this state or of the United States to a representative of the state or the United States
or governmental division thereof, charged
with the duty of enforcing that provision,
and evidence thereof is inadmissible, unless
the judge finds that (a) the identity.of the
person furnishing the information has already
been otherwise disclosed or (b) disclosure
of his identity is essential to assure a
fair determination of the issues.
Utah R. Evid., Vol. 9B, U.C.A., 1953 (1977).
In State v. Forshee, Utah, 611 P.2d 1222 (1980), we
said, •There are two exceptions to the general privilege of
nondisclosure of an informer's identity. Disclosure is required (1) when the informer's identity is already known, and
(2) when disclosure is essential 'to assure a fair determination
of the issues. 1 •
Id. at 1224 (citing from Rule 36, Utah R.
Evid.).
Because it was evident that the defendant in that
case knew the identity of the informant, we further said:
However, it is defendant's very knowledge of
the informer's identity that further served
to vitiate any prejudice that may have otherwise resulted from the lower court's failure
to require disclosure. Thus, the court's
failure to l·equire disclosure of the informer's identity, in any event, is at best
harmless error.

3
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Id. at 1225 (citation omitted).
From our review of the record
it is equally evident that defendants in this case were aware
of the identity of the confidential informant. 1 Therefore, we
conclude that Forshee is dispositive and that defendants' clair
is without merit.
Defendants raise two issues concerning the jury
instructions that were given at trial.
Defendants' claims
focus on jury instruction No. 18 which contained the following
A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to
deprive him thereof.
Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
This instruction is in part based on U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1).
Defendants first contend that instruction No. 18 improperly comments upon a defendant's failure to testify and that it penalizes
the accused for exercising the constitutional right to remain
silent. On that basis, defendants argue that the jury instruction was improper and that the underlying statute is unconstitutional.
Defendants' second claim is that the instruction shifts
the burden of proof to defendants and is therefore inconsistent
with defendants' rights to be presumed innocent.
Defendants' first argument, that the instruction
infringes on federal Fifth Alllend.JDent rights, is not persuasive.
Nothing in the instruction required testimony by defendants,
because an explanation of possession could have been made by the
testimony of other witnesses or by other evidence.
In a similar
situation, the United States Supreme Court found this argument
to be without merit:
"Petitioner also argues that the permissive
inference in question infringes his privilege against selfincrimination. The Court has twice rejected this argument."
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 (1973) .2 Therefore,
1. The testimony of the officers about this circumstance of
their introduction to the defendants, and the events in which
the informant participated, make it clear that the informant was
known to the defendants, and readily identifiable by them once
his part in the proceedings was disclosed.
2.
In Barnes, the disputed instruction included a statement
that the petitioner had a right not to take the witness stand
and also that evidence other than defendant's testimony could
explain possession.
In the instant case, the jury was only instructed on defendants' privilege to not testify.
There was,
however, testimony by defendant Chambers' wife which attempted
to explain possession of some of the items involved in this case
Thus, the possibility of explanation provided by evidence other
than defendants' testimony should have been obvious to the jury.
Nos. 19151 and 19152
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we conclude that defendants' argument on this point is not compelling.
See also Annot., 88 A.L.R. 3d 1178 (1978) (indicating
the trend established in recent cases that instructions such as
the one in question do not constitute an improper col!lltlent by the
court on the defendant's failure to testify, and do not violate
the privilege against self-incrimination).
Defendants' second claim regarding the jury instruc' , ons is more problematic.
Defendants argue that instruction
1Jc_,_
18 violates their rights to a presumption of innocence and
Jmproperly shifts the burden of proving innocence to defendants.
Instruction No. 18 refers to a statutory presumption which links
the basic fact of possession of recently stolen property, in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of possession, to the
ultimate fact or conclusion that the person in possession stole
the property.
The presumption does not mandate a finding of
guilt; it merely provides that proof of the basic fact is
sufficient to serve as prima facie evidence of the ultimate
fact.
Inferences and presumptions are common factfinding
devices whereby one fact is used to determine the existence of
another fact.
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S.
140, 156 (1979); State v. Robichaux, Utah, 639 P.2d 207, 208
(1981).
•[I)n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary) device's constitutional validity in a given case
remains constant:
the device must not undermine the factf inder' s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by
the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt.• Allen, 442 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted).
In their
argument, defendants rely on State v. Walton, Utah, 646 P.2d
689 (1982), where this Court found reversible error based on an
instruction which read, *[T)he law presumes that a person
intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his own
acts.• In Walton, we followed Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510 (1979), which held that an identical instruction violated
due process.
In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
jury could have interpreted the presumption as irrebuttable or
alternatively as requiring a high level of proof in order to
rebut the presumption, thereby •effectively shifting the burden
of persuasion . . . . •
Id. at 517. The standard established
in Sandstrom is •whether~he challenged jury instruction had
the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof
enunciated in [In re) Winship (397 U.S. 358 (1970)) . . . . •
Id. at 521. As the Court noted in Sandstrom, Id. at 520, In re
Winship held that the due process clause requires •proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime .
. charged.• 397 U.S. at 364.
The United States Supreme Court has recently once
again addressed the constitutionality of presumptions used in
jury instructions.
In Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965
(1985), the Court dealt with an instruction quite similar to
that held unconstitutiunal in Sandstrom. Using the same
•threshold inquiry• as to the nature of the presumption as
~as used in Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514, the Franklin Court
established that~instruction included a mandatory
5
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presumption, i.e., a presumption which "instructs the jury that
it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain
predicate facts." 105 s. Ct. at 1971. The Court then applied
the Sandstrom standard of relief of burden of proof on an
element of the crime charged.
Id. On the basis of that
analysis, however, Franklin extended the Sandstrom decision an~
found that use of any mandatory rebuttable presumption in a
jury instruction is unconstitutional.

A mandatory rebuttable presumption . . .

relieves the state of the affirmative burden
of persuasion on the presumed element by
instructing the jury that it must find the
presumed element unless the defendant
persuades the jury not to make such a
finding.
A mandatory rebuttable presumption is perhaps less onerous [than an
irrebuttable or conclusive presumption) from
the defendant's perspective, but it is no
less unconstitutional.

Id. at 1972-73.
The instruction given in this case is different from
the instructions found to be unconstitutional in Sandstrom and
Franklin.
In this case the trial court instructed the jury
that possession of recently stolen property, in the absence of
a satisfactory explanation, is "prima facie" evidence of theft
by the person in possession of the property. Such an instruction, nevertheless, fits within the Franklin definition of a
mandatory rebuttable presumption:
"A [mandatory] rebuttable
presumption . . . requires the jury to find the element unless
the defendant persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted." 105 S. Ct. at 1971, n. 2.
We therefore hold that the instruction given in this
case was unconstitutional.
Further, although there was another
instruction given, instruction No. 25, which restated the
presumption in permissive form, the additional instruction
failed to cure the defect.
"Language that merely contradicts
and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will
not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no
way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the
jurors applied in reaching their verdict." 105 S. ct. at 1975
(footnote omitted).
Thus, because the mandatory presumption in
question directly related to the determination of defendants'
guilt, we hold that defendants are entitled to a new trial.
In reaching this decision, we~further note that
instruction No. 18 was accompanied by another instruction whicr.
defined "prima facie."
Instruction No. 19 read as follows:
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The term •Prima Facie• as used herein
means, at first sight; on the first appearance; on the face of it; so far as can be
judged from the first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed to be true unless
disproved by some evidence to the contrary.
,rmphasis added.)
The use of the word •disproved• could well
1,ave indicated to a juror that the defendants were required to
rl1sprove guilt. An instruction which could reasonably be
understood to relieve the State of its burden of proof is
constitutionally defective.
See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510, 524.
Thus, the use of this instruction would itself have required
reversal based on principles dictated by Sandstrom and without
reference to the stricter application prescribed by Franklin.
Finally, we address the continued viability of the
language of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1).
Although a jury
instruction which uses the statutory language verbatim is, as
we have stated, unconstitutional, we find no similar infirmity
in the statute itself as the statute, properly construed, is
directed to the court.
In State v. Asay, Utah, 631 P.2d 861
(1981), this court construed the function of section 76-6-402(1)
and upheld an instruction which, unlike the instant case, did
not use the statutory language. The Court pointed out that the
statute does not affect the jury's weighing of the evidence;
rather, the statute provides a standard by which to determine
the sufficiency of the evidence for submitting the case to the
jury. The statute may properly be used to defeat a claim by a
defendant that the State has, as a matter of law, failed to
establish a prima facie case against the defendant.
Id. at
864; State v. Gellatly, 22 Utah 2d 149, 151, 449 P.2d---g93,
994-95 (1969).
This construction of the statute is consistent
with our early decisions which found that giving an instruction
using the term prima facie was improper, although not prejudicial where the court further instructed the jury that the
State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Crowder, 114 Utah 202, 210, 197 P.2d 917, 921-22 (1948); State
v. Hall, 105 Utah 162, 175-76, 145 P.2d 494, 500 (1944). ~
State v. Crowder, the court said, •what constitutes a prima
facie case is one for the court to determine and the jury does
not pass on nor is it concerned at all with that question.
This statute is addressed only to the court . . . . "
114 Utah at 209-10, 197 P.2d at 921, (referring to U.C.A.,
1943, § 103-36-l, unsatisfactory explanation of recently stolen
property is prima facie evidence of guilt). Similarly, in
State v. Hall, 105 Utah at 175, 197 P.2d at 500, the Court
noted:
The jury is not concerned with a
determinati0n of when the State has made
out a prima facie case; its duty is to
determine the issue of ultimate guilt.

7
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An instruction . . . which concerns
the evidence necessary to make out a prima
facie case for the State would only be
confusing and might lead the jury to
conclude the State had met its burden of
proving ultimate guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt by making out a prima facie case.
(Citations omitted.)
The Court then concluded that the prima
facie instruction was improper but not prejudicial in light of
other instructions regarding the State's burden of proof.
In State v. Baretta, 47 Utah 479, 155 P. 343 (1916),
the Court indicated that only in cases where the burden of
proof shifts may juries properly be concerned with questions of
what constitutes a prima facie case (i.e., civil cases).
In
criminal cases, however, where the burden remains on the State
throughout the case, the jury should not be involved in such
considerations.
Undoubtedly, the court has to do with questions of a prima facie case whenever it
withholds from, or submits a case to, the
jury.
But that determination . . . is one
of law and not of fact . . . . So, when a
case as this is submitted to a jury, they
have nothing to do with questions of what is
or what is not, a prima facie case . . . .
They, to convict, are required to find an
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
. . . . We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen property when the party in
possession failed to make a satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of guilt,
may do harm by singling out and emphasizing
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other evidence which may be of equal
or greater importance, and, without further
explanation or direction, may tend to convey
a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated particulars are shown the burden of
proof is shifted to the accused, which, if
not sustained by him, requires the verdict
to be cast against him . . . . So we do not
see what the question of a prima facie case
has to do with the jury and think the charge
ought not to have been given.
47 Utah at 489-90, 155 P.2d at 346-47.

~

(Citations omitted).

We therefore conclude that a jury instruction using th,:
language of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-402(1) is unconstitutional because it directly relates to the issue of guilt and relieves tr,
State of its burden of proof. The statute itself, however, is
addressed to the court and merely provides a standard by which
Nos.
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to determine whether the evidence presented warrants submission
to the jury.
Thus, the statutory language should not be used
in any form in instructing juries in criminal cases, and we
expressly disavow the language and holdings of our earlier
cases to the contrary.
on that basis, the statute is not constitutionally defective.
Defendants also claim that the evidence in this case
insufficient to support their convictions.
Because we are
,pmanding for a new trial, we do not treat this issue.

, ac

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is
remanded for a new trial.
WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Michael D. Zillllllerman, Justice
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